Several difficulties that accompany Plato's theory of Forms have received considerable attention in the philosophical literature in the past half century. A great deal of discussion and controversy surrounds the dialogue Parmenides and the group of considerations commonly called the “Third Man Argument”. Our purpose here is to strike out in one direction suggested by this passage, but it can in no way be thought of as an exegesis nor a logical elucidation of the “Third Man Argument” itself. While what (...) we shall say here has an obvious affinity and connection with the Parmenides passage, the two principal questions that concern us here are of a more general nature than the specific points in the Parmenides. The first is whether Plato's theory of Forms involves a regress which is ruinous to the theory. The second is, if a self-destructive regress is a necessary consequence of the theory, what elements of Plato's theory make the regress inescapable. (shrink)

I. Wesen und entwicklung des humanitätsgedankens.--II. Der socialismus.--III. Der individualismus.--IV. Der utilitarianismus.--V. Der pessimismus.--VI. Der evolutionismus.--VII. Der positivismus.--VIII. Nietzsches uebermensch.--IX. Die hauptgrundsätze einer modernen humanitätsethik.

Open peer commentary on the article “Making Sense and Meaning: On the Role of Communication and Culture in the Reproduction of Social Systems” by Raivo Palmaru. Upshot: The author addresses implications arising from socializing observer-dependent heuristics. Above all, Palmaru’s terminology is called into question since its conceptual deficiencies with regard to the relation between an observing system and its environments cause naturalistic fallacy. The author’s reply espouses a concise reanalysis of the complementary relations of fundamentally incomparable domains, namely the observer (...) and the social system. (shrink)

Издание содержит: познание в контексте культуры; эпистемология социально-гуманитарного знания; история философии: опыт познания культуры и др.

While ante rem structuralism offers a promising account of mathematical truth and mathematical ontology, several of the most prominent formulations of the view seem to be subject to significant difficulties involving the identity conditions of the objects they posit. In this paper I argue that those difficulties can be overcome by adopting encoding structuralism, a version of realism about mathematical objects developed by Bernard Linsky, Uri Nodelman and Edward Zalta.